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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ARTICLE
II SHELL GAME

Heidi Kitrosser*

INTRODUCTION
This essay considers the important but under-explored link
between politics and constitutional interpretation in the realm of
national security. The school of constitutional interpretation at
which it looks is "presidential exclusivity," which has gone from
relative obscurity to prominence in the political branches and in
public debate over the past several decades. Exclusivists deem
the President to have substantial discretion under Article II of
the Constitution "to override statutory limits that he believes
interfere with his ability to protect national security."1
Exclusivists often claim that they champion a return to the
presidency's traditional role.2 Yet other scholars, particularly
David B arron and Martin Lederman in a two-article series in the
Harvard Law Review, have shown that exclusivity has only
recently become a presence, let alone a prominent and
influential one, in the political branches.3

*
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am very grateful to
Dale Carpenter, David Dana, and Jill Hasday for extremely thoughtful comments.
1. Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEXAS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (internal citations
omitted).
2. See, e.g. , JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 119-25 (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 6-7, 29-35 (2006) (hereinafter DOJ
WHITE PAPER) ; Abraham D. Sofaer, Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, in THE
FETTERED PRESIDENCY 15, 18-20 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989);
Gary J. Schmitt & Abram N. Shulsky, The Theory and Practice of Separation of Powers:
The Case of Covert Action, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra, at 59, 61-62.
3. See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief
at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 , 1027 (2008); David
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing
the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). See
also, e.g. , Kitrosser, supra note 1, at
(exploring the recent rise of exclusivity within
the political branches in the context of wiretapping).
_

_
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The first question that this essay takes up is why exclusivity
has come so far over the past several decades in the political
branches and why it has demonstrated appeal and staying power
across parties. Such a question admittedly lends itself to no
magic bullets, no one factor or handful of factors to explain
everything. Yet logic suggests that political incentives must
constitute at least an important piece of the puzzle, and that is
the piece on which this essay focuses.
The upshot is this: Since roughly the end of World War II,
with a notable exception in the post-Watergate period, it has
increasingly been in the interests of congresspersons to be
perceived as non-obstructionist toward whatever activities the
President deems necessary to advance national security. To
avoid the dreaded "weak on national security" label, and to
balance that avoidance against the risk of seeming either a
presidential lackey (particularly if the President is of a different
party) or of being implicated should scandals emerge (think Iran
Contra or Abu Ghraib ), congresspersons are generally best off
appearing tough and resolute, while retaining the ability to plead
ignorance should things turn out badly. These incentives are
captured in a statement reportedly made in 1973 by Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) to
CIA Director James Schlesinger: "'Just go ahead and do it, but I
don't want to know! "'4 Other former CIA Directors corroborate
the ubiquity of this attitude among members of Congress. For
example, former Director William Colby has said that "Congress
is informed to the degree that Congress wants to be informed"
and '"stressed . . . that several [congressional] overseers had
expressed little interest in briefings from the CIA.' " 5 Happily for
the President, these incentives complement his own. If it is
politically problematic for a congressperson to be perceived as
"weak on national security," it is the kiss of death for a President
or presidential candidate. The President must straddle the line in
public perception between seeming willing to "do whatever it
takes" to protect national security and being able to credibly
invoke American ideals of fairness and the rule of law. Of
course, the President is also deeply invested in avoiding scandal,

4. DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE OVERSIGHT:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 9 (2006).
5. Loch K. Johnson, "The Contemporary Presidency": Presidents, Lawmakers, and
Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, 34 PRES. STUDIES Q. 828, 833
(2004). See also, e.g. , KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET
GOVERNMENT 42-44 (1996).
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or at minimum, retaining plausible deniability should scandal
develop over national security activities.
Exclusivity, then, aligns with the political interests of nearly
everyone in national political life. Embracing exclusivity enables
Presidents and congresspersons to associate themselves with the
iconic image of a tough President and to situate their allegiance
to that image in a larger narrative of keeping faith with the
Constitution. Furthermore, making or acquiescing in exclusivity
claims enables one to suggest that the Constitution simply ties
their hands, preventing them, for instance, from disclosing or
demanding information or taking a clear, public stand on a
controversial matter. While this is not the only explanation for
exclusivity's rise in ubiquity and legitimacy among the political
branches over the past several decades, it is an important part of
the picture.
This essay also considers how exclusivity manifests itself in
the political branches. Exclusivity's manifestations are closely
linked to its political appeal. The latter is contingent, after all, on
the uses to which political actors are able to put exclusivity. In
this respect, this essay observes that political branch players
benefit as much if not more from exclusivity's shadow effect as
from their invoking it explicitly. For example, however weak
exclusivist arguments might be to the effect that the President
had a constitutional power to secretly circumvent the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") for several years, the
frequent repetition of these arguments by administration
defenders created a fog of uncertainty around the issue among
the public. This fog makes it more politically palatable for
others, without invoking exclusivity explicitly, to suggest that the
matter comes down to mere political differences, or that it is
simply best to look ahead rather than to linger on complex
questions of legal culpability.
This essay also explains that the combined effect of
exclusivity's many active and passive uses is that of an elaborate
shell game. In this "Article II shell game," accountability is the
palmed object and potential accountability mechanisms are the
shells. 6 If the game is well played, the public will often be told
6. According to The Random House College Dictionary (1988), a shell game is "a
sleight-of-hand swindling game resembling thimblerig but employing walnut shells or the
like instead of cups." Id. at 1212. The same dictionary defines thimblerig as a "swindling
game" in which "the operator palms a pellet or pea while appearing to cover it with one
of three thimblelike cups, and then, moving the cups about, offers to bet that no one can
tell under which cup the pellet or pea lies." Id. at 1365.
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that accountability does not lie under one shell for exclusivist
reasons, but that it may lie under the next shell, only for the
process to repeat ad infinitum. For example, Congress may
retroactively immunize certain groups for alleged statutory
violations, partly on the basis that the legality question is
uncertain in light of exclusivity. Members of Congress or
witnesses supporting retroactive liability may argue, however,
that other means for investigation exist such as congressional
hearings. Later, those same persons or others may argue that
congressional hearings ought not to occur or must be very
narrow to avoid unveiling information that the President alone
has the constitutional power - again, from an exclusivist
perspective - to determine whether to reveal. To be clear, my
claim is not that each participant subjectively intends, at the time
that they raise a particular Article II objection, to close off other
accountability avenues and thus to partake in a shell game.
Rather, my point is that the increasing presence and perceived
legitimacy of exclusivist arguments - and the incentive of
political branch actors to raise or acquiesce in exclusivist claims
or to benefit from their shadow effect - give rise to multiple,
often successive exclusivist blocks to accountability. Thus, the
effect is like that of a coordinated shell game.
Part I of this essay discusses historical and cultural changes
that make exclusivity increasingly attractive politically to
Presidents and congresspersons alike. Part II summarizes some
of the major ways in which politicians actively make use of, or
passively benefit from, exclusivist invocations of Article II. Part
III demonstrates that the overall effect of such uses is that of an
elaborate shell game across branches, parties, and
administrations. It illustrates this phenomenon through the
example of the Bush Administration's "Terrorist Surveillance
Program," or "TSP. " Exclusivity contributed to the program's
years-long secrecy, defenses of it after it was publicly revealed,
and efforts across the Bush and Obama administrations to shield
its participants from accountability.
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I. THE AGGRESSION HEURISTIC, THE RULE OF LAW
IDEAL, AND PARTISANSHIP: THE POLITICS OF
NATIONAL SECURITY
A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE AND THE AGGRESSION
HEURISTIC

While the United States was born out of war and was no
stranger to war for its first two centuries,
[i] t was not until the Second World War that the United
States, which heretofore had maintained small military
budgets and a modest regular army, experienced a dramatic
change in its world view. From then on this country has
operated on the assumption that it faced a permanent
national security emergency that had to be handled primarily
by military means.. . . Mobilization of the society for 'national
7
security' has long been the substitute for total war.

While this passage was published in the midst of the Cold
War, the staying power of the "national security state'' 8 that it
describes was evidenced throughout the nineteen-nineties, when
the large-scale military and national security infrastructure that
had been built up since the Second World War - what President
Eisenhower famously called "the military-industrial complex"9 continued, in some respects even broadened its activities, with
retooled justifications. 10 As historian Andrew J. B acevich puts it,
"at the end of the Cold War, Americans said yes to military
power."11 From this perspective, Bacevich explains, the U.S.
response to the tragic events of September 1 1th "demonstrates
how little the unprecedented attacks [of that day] affected the
assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy; the terrorists
succeeded only in reinvigorating the conviction that destiny
summons the United States" and that military power is the
means to achieve that destiny. 12
7. Richard J. Barnet, The Ideology of the National Security State, 26 MASS. REV.
483, 483, 485 (1985). See also GARY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1-4, 57-59, 98-102, 237-40 (2010); ANDREW J.
BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: How AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY
WAR 16, 26-28, 32-33 (2005); Marcus G. Raskin, Democracy Versus the National Security
State, 40 LAW & CONT. PROBLEMS 189, 196-99, 209-11 (1976).
8. This term is commonly used to refer to the post-World War II state of affairs.
See generally, e.g. , WILLS, supra note 7; Barnet, supra note 7; Raskin, supra note 7.
9. Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, 8 PUB.
PAPERS 1035, 1038 (Jan. 17, 1961).
10. See BACEVICH, supra note 7, at 19, 35, 53-59, 63-64, 79-90 (2005).
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id. at 13-14.
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The rise of the national security state caused two crucially
important shifts in American life and government. First, while
the Constitution's founders detested the notion of a large
standing army and took steps to ensure against the same, the
U.S. now has a sprawling military and national security
infrastructure etched deeply into its architecture. As late as 1939,
the United States had only "a small standing army, spent 1.4%
of the gross national product on defense, [and] had a handful of
foreign bases. "13 While annual defense spending in the years
since the end of World War II has had its relative ups and
downs, it has remained substantially higher as a percentage of
GDP and by other measures than in the years before 1 940, with
the exception of the World War I years.14
The second major shift brought about by the national
security state is cultural. Between World War I and World War
II:
[A] U.S. Army chief of staff could veto plans for an airplane
because it was immoral to bomb civilians. A secretary of state
could reject plans for an intelligence operation because
'gentlemen do not read each other's mail.' And j ust before
World War I a president (Woodrow Wilson in 1915) could fly
into a rage upon discovering that the army actually had
contingency plans for fighting wars. 15

Even during World War II, members of Congress could publicly
proclaim that the federal government should never wiretap and
Congress could reject FDR's pleas to pass a statute authorizin§
wire-tapping and the use of wiretap-derived evidence in courts. 6
Yet over the past several generations, mainstream consensus has
shifted. In 1 985, Richard B arnet made a striking set of
observations that remain equally apt in 2010:
[T] he national security state, despite its failure to deliver
physical, psychological or spiritual security, enj oys the
overwhelming support of the American public. And this is so
despite rising concern about huge budget deficits substantially
attributable to military expenditures and a disturbing increase
in secrecy and surveillance in American life, all in the name of
13. Barnet, supra note 7, at 485.
14. See James L. Clayton, The Fiscal Limits of the Warfare-Welfare State: Defense
and Welfare Spending in the United States Since 1900, 29 W. POL. Q. 364, 366 tbl.1, 368
tbl.2, 369 chart 2, 370 tbl.3, 371 tbl.4 (1976). See also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 47-55
tbl.3.1 (2010).
15. Barnet, supra note 7, at 485.
16. See Kitrosser, supra note 1, at_.
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national security.
The "engineering of consent" is crucial to the national
security state. Edward L. Bernay's definition of public
relations accurately describes the process by which the
consensus on national security is maintained. Most Americans
are inhibited from having or expressing personal convictions
on matters relating to national security for a number of
reasons. First, the topic is amorphous and seemingly complex.
The masses of numbers about weapons, budgets, "kill ratios"
and other bits of j argon make it seem almost hopeless to
follow the "debate. " Second, the great emphasis put by
government on the creation of classified information and the
highly publicized, though not always successful, effort to
protect secret information, cause most citizens to believe that
they do not know sufficient "facts" to challenge official truth.
Third, the threat to the survival of the nation is invoked in
17
support of every new weapons system.

The myopia of mainstream discourse is evident in politics,
culture and journalism today.1 8 Particularly since 9/1 1 , such
discourse has evinced a phenomenon that I call the "aggression
heuristic." By the aggression heuristic I mean a presumption
that, as between two national security policies, one that relies on
"aggression" and one that does not, the former is more security
enhancing. By aggression, I mean either violence or significant
civil liberties incursions. The aggression heuristic exists despite
the fact that evidence for the relative efficacy of particular
17. Barnet, supra note 7, at 494-95. For an outstanding critique of academic
arguments that champion deference to the executive branch through rationales similar to
those described by Barnet, see Alice Ristroph, Professors Strangelove, 1 1 GREEN BAG
2D 245 (2008). Cf. Louis Fisher, The Law: Scholarly Support for Presidential Wars, 35
PRES. STUD. Q. 590 (2005) (explaining, in article's abstract, that "political scientists and
historians have . . . imbued the presidency with magical qualities of expertise and good
intentions. . . . Supported by the academic community, presidents now regularly claim
that the Constitution allows them to wage war against other countries without receiving
either a declaration or authorization from Congress. "); David Gray Adler, The Law:
Textbooks and the President's Constitutional Powers, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 376, 379 (2005)
(college political science textbooks typically "prefer vanilla descriptions to constitutional
critiques and criticisms," leaving students "untutored and thus unequipped to pose
citizen challenges to executive claims of authority.").
18. See, e.g. , WILLS, supra note 7, at 161-66, 238-40; BACEVICH, supra note 7, at
14-15, 18, 90; Glenn Greenwald, The NYT's View of "Journalistic Objectivity'',
SALON.COM, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/12/23/
objectivity/; Glenn Greenwald, The Foreign Policy Community, SALON.COM, Aug. 8,
2007, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/08/08/powers/; Glenn Greenwald,
The Washington Post, Dan Froomkin and the Establishment Media, SALON.COM, June 19,
2007, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/06/19/washpost/; Glenn Greenwald,
Joe Klein and Beltway Seriousness, SALON.COM, July 26, 2007, http://www.salon.com/
opinion/greenwald/2007/07/26/klein/.
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aggressive measures at best is inconclusive.19 At worst, the
evidence reveals that aggression often is counter-productive,
making Americans less safe in both the short and long terms. 20
That the aggression heuristic pervades mainstream thinking
and politics is evidenced in a number of ways. First, public
opinion polls routinely show that large numbers of Americans,
often maj orities, support aggressive techniques. For example, an
April 2009 Gallup poll fourid that 55 % of Americans believe
that the use of "harsh interrogation techniques on terror
suspects during the Bush Administration" was justified, "while
only 36% say it was not." 21 Similarly, an August 2009 Rasmussen
19. For example, a 2009 Inspectors General Report on the TSP and related
surveillance programs explains that "[m]ost [intelligence community (IC)] officials
interviewed by the [IC Inspectors General] had difficulty citing specific instances where
[the TSP and related programs] had directly contributed to counterterrorism successes."
It noted, however, that "[t]here are several cases identified by IC officials and in IC
documentation where [the TSP and related programs] may have contributed to a
counterterrorism success." OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE DEP'T OF DEF. ET
AL., UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 36 (2009)
[hereinafter IG REPORT].
20. See generally DAYID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007). See also, e.g. , Jane Mayer,
Counterfactual, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 29, 2010, at 98 (detailing flaws in former Bush
speechwriter's claims about the efficacy of enhanced interrogations and noting, among
other things, that the speechwriter "does not address the many false confessions given by
detainees under torturous pressure, some of which have led the U.S. tragically astray");
Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, Experts Urge Keeping Two Options for Terror Trials,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at A15 (Bush and Obama Administration officials express
concern that political pressures to hold only military commission trials are
counterproductive to national security); Matthew Alexander, Torture's Loopholes, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A39 (former Air Force interrogator notes that in his experience,
"torture or even harsh but legal treatment never got us useful information. Instead, such
tactics invariably did just the opposite, convincing detainees to clam up"; abuse of
prisoners is also used by al-Qaeda "as a recruiting tool"); What Went Wrong: Torture and
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 22-46, 514-26 (2009) (testimony of Ali Soufan, Chief Executive, The Soufan
Group LLC) (extensive analysis by former FBI terrorist interrogator as to the ineffectual
nature of "enhanced interrogation" methods; among other things Soufan recounts his
successes with non-enhanced methods on Abu Zubaydah and the failures of CIA
contractors who took over with enhanced methods; Soufan also identifies falsehoods in
examples given by Dick Cheney and others of enhanced interrogation's successes);
Coleen Rowley & Other Intelligence Veterans, How Not to Counter Terrorism,
CONSORTIUMNEWS.COM,
June
18,
2007,
http://www.consortiumnews.com/
2007/061807a.html (citing counter-productive nature of torture and of mass data
collection- with respect to the latter, explaining that, in the wake of loosened restrictions
on data collection, most data collected "will never be evaluated" and much will be
irrelevant).
21. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority Wants Bush-Era Interrogations Investigated,
GALLUP.COM, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118006/Slim-Majority-Wants
Bush-Era-Interrogations-Investigated.aspx. A somewhat curious twist, however, is that
the same poll found that 51% of Americans favor, though 42% of Americans oppose, an
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poll found that 65% of U.S. voters "say it is at least somewhat
likely that waterboarding and other harsh interrogation
techniques helped secure valuable intelligence information."
44% deemed it "very likely." 22 And a nationwide Rasmussen
telephone survey taken shortly after the attempted airliner
bombing on Christmas Day, 2009 found that 58% of U.S. voters
"say waterboarding and other aggressive interrogation
techniques should be used to gain information" from the
attempted bomber. 23 Americans' assumptions about the efficacy
of telephone wiretapping appear similar to those about torture.
In the wake of the discovery that the Bush Administration had
secretly approved the warrantless wiretapping of calls between
the U.S. and abroad for several years through the TSP, despite a
statute requiring warrants, a majority of Americans deemed the
Bush Administration "right" to have done so in a USA Today
Gallup poll. 24
Politicians of both parties frequently behave in a manner
consistent with the aggression heuristic. That is, they act as
though their being viewed as averse to aggressive policies - or
even supporting investigations of the same - is equivalent to
being deemed weak on national security and is thus a political
liability to be avoided. For example, in 2008, a majority
Democratic Congress facing a deeply unpopular Republican
Administration passed legislation - the FISA Amendments Act,
or FAA - granting the Administration much of the wiretapping
authority that it had sought including retroactive immunity for
telecommunications companies that had participated in the TSP.
Many Democrats who initially opposed the legislation changed
investigation into the use of such techniques. Id. Statistician Nate Silver explains Gallup's
interpretation of the investigation findings: "this isn't really about torture-rather, it's
about investigations. We Americans like to investigate! 'While a slim majority favors an
investigation, on a relative basis the percentage is quite low because Americans are
generally [more] supportive of government probes into potential misconduct by public
officials."' Nate Silver, Explaining the Contradictory Torture Polling, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT,
Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/04/explaining-torture-polling.html
(quoting Jones, supra).
22. 49% Oppose Justice Department Probe of Bush-era CIA, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/
general_politics/august_2009/49_opposejustice_department_probe_of_bush_era_cia.
23. 58% Favor Waterboarding of Plane Terrorist to Get Information, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS, Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/
general_politics/december_2009/58_favor_waterboarding_of_plane_terrorist_to_get_inform
ation.
24. USA Today Gallup Poll, http://www.usatoday.com/newsipollsltables/Jive/2006-09-18-pollhtm,
question #l 7(1ast visited May 17, 2010) (recording majority approval in polls taken Jan.
6-8, 2006 and Sep. 15-17, 2006; recording sizable minority approval in polls taken Jan.
20-22, 2006 and Feb. 9-12, 2006).
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course, apparently responding to the political risk of appearing
weak on terrorism. In championing the FAA, President Bush
publicly stated that he would veto any bill that did not contain
retroactive immunity, that a temporary set of FISA
Amendments was soon to expire, and that Congress thus would
leave dangerous intelligence gaps and make Americans
vulnerable to terrorist attack should they not pass the FAA.
Democrats who supported the FAA echoed President Bush's
remarks. Diane Feinstein said that "taking no action means that
we will be opening ourselves, in my view, to the possibility of a
major attack." 25 Then-presidential candidate and Senator Barack
Obama also supported the FAA after having earlier vowed to
oppose any legislation containing retroactive immunity. Citing
national security, Obama said, "I felt it was most - more
important for me to go ahead and support this compromise. " 26
Senator Russ Feingold, a Democrat who voted against both bills,
dismissed these arguments as "the same old story. It's been the
same ever since, basically, 9/11 . Whenever the - ultimately the
White House raises the specter of terrorism and even though it's
clearly wrong on the merits, the - too many Democrats have
caved." 27 A piece in The Economist similarly surmised that "with
'the war on terror' still a potent political issue, [Democratic]
resistance could only last so long. " 28
A similar story can be told with respect to so-called
"enhanced interrogation techniques." For example, former FBI
special agent Coleen Rowley and a group of intelligence
veterans calling themselves "Veteran Intelligence Professionals
for Sanity" recount that:
Pragmatists ( experienced intelligence and law enforcement
professionals, in particular) oppose torture because it does
not work and often is counterproductive. Nevertheless, the
president grabbed the headlines when he argued on Sept. 6,
2006 that "an alternative set of procedures" ( already
outlawed by the U.S. Army) for interrogation is required to
extract information from terrorists. He then went on to

25. David Welna, Democrats in Eavesdropping About-Face, (NPR radio broadcast
June 26, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
91934916&ps=rs.
26. Id. See also Alex Koppleman, Obama Says He Supports PISA Compromise,
SALON.COM, June 20, 2008, http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2008/06/
20/obama_fisa; Sen. Obama Issues Statement on FISA Bill, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 17,
2007 (earlier vow to support a filibuster of legislation with retroactive immunity).
27. Welna, supra note 25.
28. Guarding the Guards, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2008, at 36.
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intimidate a supine Congress into approving such procedures.
Virtually omitted from media coverage were the same-day
remarks of the pragmatist chief of Army intelligence, Lt. Gen.
John Kimmons, who conceded past "transgressions and
mistakes" and made the Army's view quite clear: "No good
intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think
history tells us that. I think the em irical evidence of the last
R
five years, hard years, tells us that." 9

Here too, the aggression heuristic drove political and media
discourse. Indeed, the heuristic's force was strong enough to
withstand, with little contest, the pragmatic objections of
intelligence veterans.
Interestingly, the first year of the Obama Administration
has seen aggression heuristic-infused push-back against
perceptions that the Administration is not using or condoning
sufficiently aggressive policies. The push-back comes from
persons and groups ranging from members of Congress to
organizations such as Elizabeth Cheney's "Keep America Safe"
campaign.3° For example, as of this essay's writing in March 2010,
a bi-partisan firestorm has been brewing against the
Administration's announced plans to try some accused 9/1 1
terrorists in the civilian court system rather than through
military commissions.31 And initial bi-partisan support for closing
the detention center at Guantanamo B ay crumbled over the last
year in the wake of fears over the possible transfer to the United
States of Guantanamo Bay prisoners.32
This last set of examples - involving push-back against a
President for appearing insufficiently aggressive - warrants a few
preliminary observations. First, given significant continuities
between the Bush and Obama Administrations on counter
terrorism, it is a testament to the strength of the aggression
heuristic and its perceived political currency that President

29. Rowley et al., supra note 20. See also other sources cited supra note 20.
30. See Keep America Safe, http://www.keepamericasafe.com/ (last visited May 17,
2010) .
31. See, e.g. , Savage & Shane, supra note 20; Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn,
Obama Advisors Set to Recommend Military Tribunals for Alleged 9111 Plotters, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 2010, at Al; Susan Crabtree, Gates, Holder Oppose Limiting Decisions on
Where Executive May Try Terrorists, THEHILL.COM, Feb. 25, 2010, http://thehill.com/
homenews/administration/83839-gates-holder-say-they-oppose-legislation-limiting
decisions-on-where-to-try-terrorists.
32. See, e.g. , Charlie Savage, Plan to Move Guantanamo Detainees Faces New
Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at Al; Charlie Savage, U.S. Said to Pick Illinois Prison
to House Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009 at A26.
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Obama has faced substantial pro-aggression pushback.33 Second,
so long as political incentives favor both aggression and
mindfulness of rule of law ideals, it stands to reason that
exclusivity will most often be used to defend aggressive behavior
rather than non-aggression. From Congress' perspective, it is
technically consistent to argue both that the President has
discretion under Article II to act however he deems best for
national security and that the President is using this discretion
badly through insufficient aggression. Yet the two arguments sit
somewhat uneasily next to each other when one considers that
exclusivity is built partly on arguments that the President alone
is structurally e �uipped to determine and carry out national
security strategy. 4 Furthermore, exclusivity is surely in tension
with legislative efforts to force the President's hand in more
aggressive directions. Hence, where congresspersons seek to
require more aggressive action - as in recent legislation
restricting the transfer of Guantanamo B ay prisoners to the
United States35-they are likely to put exclusivist arguments to
the side. From the President's perspective, there is some logic in
invoking exclusivity across the board to defend both aggressive
and non-aggressive decisions. We have seen some inkling of this
approach from the Obama Administration - Attorney General
Eric Holder and Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that the
President has discretion to determine where he tries suspected
terrorists in response to demands for military commission
trials36 - and it will be fascinating to see if this approach is used
with any frequency. Still, insofar as political incentives continue
to militate toward aggression, it is likely that the President and
Congress both will typically embrace aggression while remaining
mindful-rhetorically and perhaps more broadly - of the rule of
law ideal. Thus, it seems most plausible that the President, like
Congress, generally will continue to invoke exclusivity to favor
aggression rather than to defend presidential decisions to forego
aggressive behavior.37
33. See, e.g. , Glenn Greenwald, Nostalgia for Bush/Cheney Radicalism,
SALON.COM, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/
01/31/nostalgia.
34. See Kitrosser, supra note 1, at_.
35. Savage, U.S. Said to Pick Illinois Prison to House Detainees, supra note 32.
36. Crabtree, supra note 31.
37. For example, President Obama reportedly rejected suggestions to invoke an
emergency power statute to help fund the transfer of Guantanamo Bay prisoners to
Thompson Correctional Center in Illinois. While this approach would have relied on
statutory authority and thus would have been less extreme than exclusivity, the President
reportedly rejected the move on the basis that it would anger congresspersons critical of
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B . THE RULE OF LAW IDEAL
A potential offset to the aggression heuristic is what I call
the "rule of law ideal." The rule of law ideal embodies concepts
that are deeply embedded in our national psyche, concepts about
which Americans have learned since grade school. They include
the familiar notions that no one in the United States is above the
law, that checks and balances prevent government tyranny, and
that Americans greatly value freedom and the right to dissent.
Of course, these concepts too often take the form of empty
phrases or are even invoked to justify restrictions on freedom. It
is not uncommon, after all, to hear a politician explain that civil
liberties incursions are justified to protect freedom or to defeat
those who "hate our freedoms. "3 8 Yet the concepts at their core
have real content that resonates in U.S. history, culture, and
politics.
The rule of law ideal is evidenced in public opinion polls.
Surveys reflect that Americans support transparency, checks and
balances, and civil liberties as general matters. On the other
hand, the aggression heuristic seems to overtake these ideals
where a polling question situates rule of law values in the
context of specific national security initiatives. In a summary of
civil liberties and national security polling results from 2002-06,
the Gallup organization explained:
Numerous polling organizations have asked Americans for
their views on civil liberties, the Patriot Act, wiretapping, and
the government's collection of massive telephone records.
The results produce mixed results depending on what is

plans to transfer Guantanamo Bay prisoners to the U.S. Reportedly, the President was
also concerned that the move might lead to the statute's rescission, a concern that is
logically irrelevant from the perspective of exclusivity, whereby statutes can be
circumvented when the President deems national security to demand it. See Savage, Plan
to Move Guantanamo Detainees Faces New Delay, supra note 32. Additionally, as of
March 2010, the Administration reportedly was very seriously considering reversing
course on its plan to hold some civilian trials for detainees in the face of strong political
pushback against the same. See Kornblut & Finn, supra note 31.
38. Perhaps most famously, George W. Bush and his administration characterized
the "war on terror" as a response to those who "hate our freedoms" and "a global
struggle against the enemies of freedom. " Matthew Davis, New Name for "War on
Terror, " BBC NEWS, July 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4719169.stm;
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States: Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 ( Sept. 20, 2001) . The
rhetorical use of "freedom" to defend restrictions on freedom is hardly isolated or
limited to anti-terrorism measures. For instance, Justice Stevens argued in a dissenting
opinion that states should be permitted to ban flag burning in part because the flag
"uniquely symbolizes" "ideas of liberty and equality." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
439 ( 1989) ( Stevens, J., dissenting) .
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emphasized within the question. Polls on the one hand find
some reluctance to give up civil liberties and concern about
how far the government will go in this regard. On the other
hand, polls that stress the positive aspects of the Patriot Act
or positive reasons for restricting civil liberties find greater
public support than those that do not.39

The rule of law ideal also has some demonstrated political
currency. This was perhaps most pronounced in the early 1 970s,
when a large group of "freshmen Democrats known as the
'Watergate babies'" was swept into office amid national
perceptions of out of control presidential power. 40 As a New
York Times reporter put it at the time:
What we are beginning to see here are the reactions to the
misuse of Presidential power in Vietnam and Watergate. The
Congress is determined to try to regain some of the power it
lost or abandoned to the President in the postwar generation,
to limit the scope of executive privilege, to limit the
President's power to make war without the consent of the
Congress, and to insist, if possible, that the President spend all
funds appropriated by the Congress.41

Landmark hearings were also held in both houses of Congress in
the 1970s, examining in some detail intelligence and national
security related abuses of the preceding several decades. 4 2 In
more recent times, perceived national security excesses in the
Bush Administration led to some limited hearings and rebukes
in Congress, at times from members of President Bush's own
party.43
As with public opinion, however, the rule of law ideal in
politics is vulnerable to the appeal of the aggression heuristic
when national security is invoked. Even during the post
Watergate period, investigations and legislative proposals faced
political stumbling blocks in the form of national security based
objections. 44 And angry talk by Republicans and Democrats
alike about national security abuses have generally given way, in
the post-9/1 1 era, to curtailed investigations, legislative
39. Gallup's Pulse of Democracy: The Patriot Act and Civil Liberties,
http://institution.gallup.com/content/?ci=5263 (last visited May 18, 2010).
40. See Steven V. Roberts, House G. O.P. Freshmen are Speaking up on Party
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1979, at A16; James Reston, The Class of 1974, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1974, at 45.
41. Reston, supra note 40.
42. See generally, e.g. , OLMSTED, supra note 5.
43. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3.b.1; text accompanying note 56.
44. See, e.g. , OLMSTED, supra note 5, at 2-9, 103-12, 121-43, 147-51, 154-89.
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acquiescence to aggression, and legislative push-back against
perceptions of insufficient aggression.45
C. PARTISANSHIP
The Constitution assumes that Congress and the President
will keep one another in check as natural institutional rivals.46
From this perspective, the President has incentives to defend the
presidency against congressional encroachment and Congress
has incentives to defend itself against presidential encroachment.
Yet as an entire genre of literature is devoted to explaining, that
plan hasn't worked out so well. Instead, history has seen the rise
of an imperial presidency and a relatively quiescent, enabling
Congress.47 One reason for the failure of founding assumptions is
the rise of cohesive national political parties and Presidents as
party leaders.4 8 The political fortunes of congresspersons are
much more closely tied to their respective political parties than
to the institutions in which they sit.49 Hence, members of
Congress by and large are unwilling to challenge a President
within their own party, even where the President steps on the
powers and interests of Congress as an institution. 50
It is self-evident why the "separation of parties, not
powers" 5 1 lends itself to congressional acquiescence during times
of unified government. Yet even during times of divided
government, "members of the President's party are not likely to
break ranks and vote to limit presidential initiatives."5 2 This is a
particularly strong impediment to Congress' ability to pass
legislation over a presidential veto.

45. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3.b.1-2; supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 317-20 (Madison) (Signet Classic 2003).
47. The seminal work that describes this phenomenon is ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). For a more recent take, see
generally CHARLIE SAvAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
'
(2007).
48. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313-14 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2678-79 (2005).
49. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 2323; William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons
Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505,
518-19 (2008).
50. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 2344; Marshall, supra note 49, at 518-19;
Tushnet, supra note 48, at 2679.
51. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48.
52. Neil Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 395, 409 (2009).
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More to the point, any challenge that divided government
poses to the presidency tends to be overcome in the realm of
national security, especially post-9/1 1 , by the aggression
heuristic. The bipartisan impact of the aggression heuristic is
demonstrated by the post-9/11 examples of deep congressional
acquiescence during divided government detailed earlier. More
generally, the phenomenon of bipartisan deference to aggressive
presidential policies in the realm of national security and foreign
affairs has been widely observed.53
II. THE POLITICAL APPEAL AND USES OF
EXCLUSIVITY
If political incentives are an important part of their calculus,
what, then, is a politician to do when it comes to national
security? If the aggression heuristic were the only factor, then
perhaps every day in politics would be like the Republican
primary debate in May 2007 in which, responding to a
hypothetical question about the actions that each would take as
President after a terrorist attack, Representative Tancredo
announced that he would be "looking for 'Jack B auer,"'
Rudolph Giuliani said that he would tell interrogators "to use
every method they could think of," and Mitt Romney added for
good measure that he wants "to double Guantanamo. "54 Of
course, the aggression heuristic is not limitless and does not exist
in a vacuum. Despite the strength of both the heuristic and of
partisanship, there are still potential political costs to being
viewed as a mere presidential lackey, whether across party lines
(think then-Democrat, now-Independent Joe Lieberman circa
2006)55 or within the same party (think Republican Dan Burton
reminding President Bush that "this is not a monarchy" in
2001) .56 Nor is the rule of law ideal without any currency in the
realm of national security. For example, politicians often strain
to couple remarks to the effect that we must use any means
necessary to interrogate terrorists with the caveat, "but not
torture."57 And surely Watergate, Iran-Contra and Abu Ghraib
53. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 52, at 414-15; Marshall, supra note 49, at 518;
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 48, at 2345, 2352; Tushnet, supra note 48, at 2678-80.
54. Transcript of Republican Presidential Primary Debate at the University of
South Carolina, May 15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/
us/politics/16repubs-text.html.
55. See Editorial, A Senate Race in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at Cl1.
56. See Ellen Nakashima, Bush Invokes Executive Privilege on Hill, WASH. POST,
Dec. 14, 2001, at A43.
57. For example, in the primary debate referenced above, Rudolph Giuliani

2010]

AR TICLE II SHELL GAME

499

dwell within politicians' mental calculi, reminders of the political
and legal risks of getting caught in an abuse-of-power scandal.
Given these conflicting pressures, the political appeal of
presidential exclusivity (again, at least insofar as it supports
aggression) is substantial. From the President's perspective,
invoking exclusivity enables him to combine the image of the
tough and decisive leader with that of constitutionalism and the
rule of law. As a practical matter, successful exclusivity claims
enable him to duck much scrutiny. He can, for example, claim ex
ante or ex post that he must forego congressional notification
requirements in the name of national security. He can also seek
to avoid judicial review by invoking the state secrets doctrine
and to stave off statutory limits on that doctrine by claiming that
they would violate Article IL The availability of exclusivity
defenses may also embolden him to violate statutes in secret, on
the theory that, if caught, he can claim an Article II based right
to circumvent the statutes. Similarly, he can argue against
congressional investigations of past statutory violations on the
theory that the violations were legal from an exclusivity
perspective and that Congress would therefore be investigating
mere political differences. Depending on the composition of
Congress, the President could add that Congress seeks to engage
in a partisan witch-hunt over political differences.5 8
For members of Congress, a variety of political factors 
including whether a member shares a party affiliation with the
President, the nature of a member's base (particularly in "safe"
House districts where party base views are often politically
determinative) , and whether a member has carved out a niche
followed his remark that interrogators should "use every method they could think of"
with the words, "It shouldn't be torture, but every method they can think of. " See
Transcript, supra note 54.
58. Arguments to the effect that investigations of the TSP or other aggressive anti
terror programs are or could turn into mere "witch-hunts" that seek to criminalize
political differences have been frequently voiced over the past several years from persons
ranging from Presidents Bush and Obama to members of Congress to commentators
inside and outside of government. See, e.g. , Looking Back in Anger, ECONOMIST, July 18,
2009, at 29; Press Release, Sen. John Cornyn, President and American People Want
Unity, Not Partisan Prosecutions and Witch Hunts ( May 19, 2009) ; Josh Gerstein &
Amie Parnes, Obama: Truth Commission is a Mistake, POLITICO.COM, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21654.html; Getting to the Truth Through a
Non-Partisan Commission of Inquiry: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, lllth Cong. 157-61 ( 2009) ( statement of David B. Rivkin, Partner, Baker
Hostetler) ; Scott Shane, To Investigate or Not: Four Ways to Look Back at Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK3. Logically, these arguments benefit from the prevalence of
exclusivist commentaries suggesting that the TSP and other statutory violations were or
might have been legal.
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reputation as one who stands up to abuses of power -may
impact the degree to which it is in their interest to actively
invoke exclusivity. Yet as we have seen, for many in Congress
this position is indeed in their political interests. Rhetorically,
invoking exclusivity enables a congressperson to show their
support for a tough and in-command President and to wrap that
support in the vestments of law and founding wisdom. Better
still, exclusivity provides an escape hatch for members of
Congress to avoid responsibility for that which may go wrong.
After all, the gist of the exclusivity case is that the Constitution
does not allow Congress to take certain actions, such as passing
legislation to constrain particular national security activities or
demanding information from the intelligence community in the
face of national security based refusals. 59
Finally, exclusivity's advantages are not reaped solely by
those who explicitly invoke it. Rather, exclusivity has an
important shadow effect for the President and members of
Congress alike, even where they choose (say, for fear of
appearing to overreach in light of the rule of law ideal) not to
invoke exclusivity explicitly. Take the example of arguments
over whether to investigate past violations of statutes restricting
torture and wiretapping. The frequently made exclusivist
defense of such violations helped to create a sense in the public
and political spheres that there is a legitimate legal debate on the
matter, however tenuous exclusivist arguments might be. This
sense helps to underscore the position that investigations would
be undertaken solely for political gain and would unnecessarily
59. John Hart Ely made a parallel observation about Congress' incentives with
respect to decisions to go to or to remain at war. Congress' incentives, he explained, lend
themselves to "studied ambiguity." John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part
I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877,
878 (1990). He also demonstrated, using the example of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution's
repeal, how the combined effect of congressional and presidential incentives favor
exclusivity:
To a legislature unwilling either to stop the war or to take responsibility for it,
the prospect of getting that incriminating Tonkin Gulf Resolution off the books
must have seemed a godsend: "The . . . debate made evident a Senate consensus
that repeal . . . would 'wipe the slate clean' of any residual congressional
authority for the Vietnam war and leave the President relying exclusively upon
his powers as Commander in Chief. " And to an executive interested in
increasing presidential power-in attempting to set a precedent to the effect
that troops can be deployed without congressional authorization-it must have
seemed so too (particularly when the President in question could claim that this
unpopular war wasn't really his, but his predecessor's). The repeal had it all:
Congress could hide, and the President could aggrandize.
Id. at 907 (quoting STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESS., THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 1-202 (Comm. Print 1982))
.
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demoralize the intelligence community and harm national
secunty. 60
Another example of exclusivity's shadow effect involves
White House failures to meet statutory requirements to share
information with the congressional intelligence committees. The
ubiquity of exclusivity in public and political discourse creates a
setting in which the President can claim with relative political
safety, should such transgressions later come to light, that he
deemed the information too dangerous to share. While this is
not an explicit exclusivist defense, an unspoken premise is that
the President legally may circumvent statutory information
sharing requirements. The more embedded this exclusivist
premise is in the national psyche, the easier it is for the President
to rely on it without invoking it and to get little political
pushback for so doing. By the same token, the exclusivist
premise removes much of the political onus from congressional
committee members to push back (and to take on the political
risks of so doing) should they learn that they have not received
disclosures to which they are statutorily entitled.61
•

III. THE ARTICLE II SHELL GAME
Given the wide-ranging political appeal of Article II
exclusivity and the varying ways in which it can be utilized, it is
not surprising that its use has bridged parties and
administrations since 9/11 . This section focuses on exclusivity's
use by Congress, the Bush Administration and the Obama
Administration (through March 2010) in justifying the TSP and
in shielding TSP participants from accountability through
congressional or judicial inquiry. Similar accountability-avoiding
moves have been used in other contexts in recent years,
particularly with respect to the designation and treatment of
terror detainees. For the sake of brevity, this section focuses on
the TSP.
As noted earlier, I refer to the pattern of activities and
decisions chronicled here as an Article II shell game because it
amounts to an indefinite bi-partisan, cross-administration, cross
institutional pattern of accountability-avoidance. 62 The key
60. See sources cited supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 77-84.
62. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Legal commentator Dahlia Lithwick
more colorfully referred to an example of this phenomenon-the Obama
Administration's avoidance of court review of Bush era extraordinary rendition
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feature of the game is that at times, one accountability
mechanism is thwarted in the name of Article II with assurances
that alternative mechanisms lie ahead, only for the alternative
mechanisms to be thwarted later by similar reasoning. The
Article II shell game enables Congress and the President alike
repeatedly to pay homage to national security and the rule of
law while working to ensure that no one looks too closely at
what is being, or has been, done.
A. THE TSP'S INITIAL SECRECY AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
As of March 2010, many of " [ t]he specific intelligence
activities that were permitted by [E ost-9/11] Presidential
Authorizations remain highly classified." 3 Thanks to admissions
by the White House and the Department of Justice in the wake
of revelations by the New York Times in December 2005,
however, we do know about the existence of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, or TSP, the program whereby the
government intercepted calls between the United States and
abroad without a warrant. 64 This section focuses on how
exclusivity enabled that program's secrecy for roughly four years
and how exclusivity underscores defenses of the program. For
precision's sake, it should be noted that some of the examples
also involve efforts to foreclose inquiries into related and still
not publicly described surveillance programs. The broader
family of Bush Administration surveillance programs, including
but not limited to the TSP, has been called the President's
Surveillance Program, or "PSP."65 For ease of reference, the
remainder of this section refers interchangeably to any programs
within the PSP as the TSP or "the program."
1.

Exclusivity-Fueled Secrecy

The TSP's roughly four-year secrecy was facilitated by the
deeply ingrained exclusivist premise that the President alone
must determine when information is too dangerous to be
programs-as "judicial Whac-a-Mole. . . . When another case pops up, the administration
slaps it down." Dahlia Lithwick, Torture Roulette, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.slate.com/
id/2238568/.
63. IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 5.
64. Id. at 5-6. The Report differentiates between the TSP, which has been publicly
acknowledged, and the President's Surveillance Program or "PSP,'' which comprises the
larger family of surveillance programs authorized through secret presidential
authorization after 9/11. The PSP includes the TSP as well as other, still classified
programs. Id. at 1, 5-6.
65. See supra note 64.
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revealed beyond select individuals. This power is manifested
especially, though not exclusively, in the classification system.66
In keeping with this premise, the White House - in large part
through the Office of the Vice President, to whom the President
had "delegated much of the national security portfolio,"67 and
particularly through the Vice President's highly influential
counsel, David Addington68 - tightly controlled access to
information about the TSP.69 Plans for the TSP and other
closely-held post 9/1 1 programs emanated from the self
described "War Council," consisting of Addington, Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo, White House Counsel (later Attorney General) Alberto
Gonzales, Timothy Flanigan of the White House Counsel's
Office, and Pentagon general counsel Jim Haynes.70
One of the most significant senses in which access to the
TSP was restricted within the executive branch was that John
Yoo - as the sole War Council member "with authority to issue
[OLC] legal opinions that were binding throughout the executive
branch"71 - essentially received carte blanche to issue legal
opinions justifying the TSP without going through OLC's normal
channels of review.7 2 This deeply insular process has since been
blamed by subsequent Bush Administration OLC officials and
by a July 2009 Inspectors General Report for substantial flaws in
the opinions' legal and factual reasoning. Indeed, it was only
after Yoo left the Department and was replaced by Jack
Goldsmith, and then-Assistant Attorney General for OLC Jay
Bybee became a federal j udge and was replaced at OLC by
Patrick Philbin, and Philbin, unlike Bybee, was "read in" to the
TSP, that alarm bells were sounded by Goldsmith and Philbin as
to the earlier opinions. What followed was a combination of
withdrawn opinions, new opinions, and a now infamous internal
revolt at the Department of Justice that reportedly led to
changes in the TSP.73 As Goldsmith put it in retrospect, the War
Council "dealt with FISA the way they dealt with other laws
66. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 881, 887-905.
67. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 63 (2008). See also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE
TERROR PRESIDENCY 76-77 (2007).
68. See MA YER, supra note 67, at 63-64; GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 76-79.
69. See IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 5-7, 10, 16; GOLDSMITH, supra note 67 at
166-67, 181-82, 205-06; MAYER, supra note 67 at 68-70, 268-69.
70. MA YER, supra note 67, at 66; GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 22-23, 98.
71. GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 23.
72. IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 10-14, 19-20, 30.
73. See IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 19-30.
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they didn't like: they blew through them in secret based on
flimsy legal opinions they guarded closely so no one could
question the legal basis for the operations. "74
Meanwhile, the congressional intelligence committees were
also kept out of the loop prior to the press revelations of
December 2005. This is so despite the statutory informing
requirements of the National Security Act. One requirement
mandates that the President "ensure that the congressional
intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed
of . . . intelligence activities . . . including any significant
anticipated intelligence activity."75 Another requires the Director
of National Intelligence [DNI] and the intelligence agency heads
to "keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities," including
through written reports on "significant anticipated intelligence
activity. "76
There is no dispute that the Bush Administration did not, at
any point prior to the New York Times story, notify the
congressional intelligence committees about the TSP. Instead,
the Administration reportedly provided limited notification to
members of the Congressional leadership, or "Gang of Eight. "77
The Gang of Eight consists of the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the congressional intelligence committees,
the Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate.78 As I have detailed elsewhere, there is no credible
argument that the TSP fell into one of the narrow statutory
exemptions from disclosure.79 Presumably, the Administration
relied on the premise that, even if the statutory informing
requirements applied, it had the constitutional prerogative to
override those mandates. 80 Indeed, while President Bush signed a
2001 amendment that bolstered the National Security Act's
74. GOLDSMITH, supra note 67, at 181.
75. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2006).
76. 50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)(1), (b).
77. See, e.g. , ALFRED CUMMING, CONG. RES. SERV., STATUTORY PROCEDURES
UNDER WHICH CONGRESS IS TO BE INFORMED OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
INCLUDING COVERT ACTIONS 6-7 (2006); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Chairman Splits
With Bush on Spy Program, NY TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at Al; 154 Cong. Rec. S6456-59
(daily ed. July 9, 2008) (remarks of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold in opposition to the FISA
Amendments Act).
78. CUMMING, supra note 77, at 5.
79. Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities:
Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1054-58 (2008).
80. Id.
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disclosure requirements, he wrote in a signing statement that the
heightened requirements would, "in some circumstances . . . fall
short of constitutional standards" and that "the Act shall be
construed . . . in a manner consistent with the President's
constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure
of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the
deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of
the Executive's constitutional duties."81
It is also worth noting that, once the program was revealed
in the press, the Bush Administration used its Gang of Eight
notification to suggest that the TSP had been approved by
Congress. 8 2 Thus, rather than pointing ahead to accountability
that might occur down the road, the Administration suggested
that it had already been held accountable. On the one hand, this
is
highly
disingenuous
given
the
exclusivity-fueled,
administration-defined terms on which notification was
provided. In addition to the limited number of persons informed,
Gang of Eight notification sessions are notorious for failing to
provide meaningful oversight. As a former congressional staffer
writes:
As a former legal counsel for both Republican and
Democratic leaders of the House and Senate intelligence
committees, I'm well aware of the limitations of these "gang
of eight" sessions. They are provided only to the leadership of
the House and Senate and of the intelligence committees,
with no staff present. The eight are prohibited from saying
anything about the briefing to anyone, including other
intelligence panel members. The leaders for whom I worked
never discussed the content of these briefings with me.
It is virtually impossible for individual members of Congress,
particularly members of the minority party, to take any
effective action if they have concerns about what they have
heard in one of these briefings. It is not realistic to expect
them, working alone, to sort through complex legal issues,
conduct the kind of factual investigation required for true
83
oversight and develop an appropriate legislative response.

81. Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1555 (Dec. 28, 2001).
82. See Kitrosser, supra note 79, at 1058. See also, e. g., Transcript: Interview with
Vice President Cheney on FOX News Sunday, FOX NEWS, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,470706,00.html.
83. Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Past the Legal Stop Signs?,
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at Bl. Senator Arlen Specter also has noted that, "[f]rom
[his] experience as a member of the "Gang of Eight" when [he] chaired the Intelligence
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On the other hand, members of Congress should not be
permitted to wriggle off the hook entirely. Congresspersons
could refuse to adhere to the Administration's restrictive terms,
could insist that statutory disclosure rules are legally controlling,
and could take their constitutional and policy arguments to the
court of public opinion. Of course, this is where congresspersons'
own political incentives come into play. As discussed earlier, and
as the facts recounted here illustrate, it is often in the political
interests of a congressperson, even one politically antagonistic to
the President, to acquiesce in requests for national security
secrecy. This, in turn, makes it in their interest to free-ride off of
exclusivity arguments, regardless of whether they genuinely,
even publicly oppose such arguments in general. Indeed, the
specter of exclusivity (and hence of relative congressional
helplessness) arguably redounded to the benefit of some
Democratic Gang of Eight members who were criticized for not
having reacted more forcefully when told of the TSP and other
Bush Administration programs, and who were also accused of
understating how much they knew about the programs. 84
Prior to the public revelations, then, the information control
exercised or acquiesced in by Gang of Eight Members and the
Bush Administration laid the groundwork for a shell game in
several respects. First, the Bush Administration sought to use
exclusivist information-control prerogatives to keep the TSP so
tightly held as to avoid accountability (outside of a small and
like-minded circle) in the first place. Second, the Administration
built a foundation for later finger-pointing - and hence for
accountability-shifting - by providing limited notice to the Gang
of Eight. In the case of the program's public discovery, the
Administration could, and eventually did argue that
accountability had already occurred through Gang of Eight
notification. Third, by acquiescing in such limited notice
Committee of the 104th Congress, even that group gets very little information." Letter
from Sen. Arlen Specter to Vice President Dick. Cheney (June 7, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/specter060706.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, Spying Necessary, Democrats Say; But Harman,
Daschle, Question President's Legal Reach, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2006, at A3. See also,
e.g., Transcript: Interview with Vice President Cheney on Fox News Sunday, supra note 82
(arguing that Gang of Eight was fully briefed on, made no objections to, and expressed
full support of the TSP). An even more heated controversy arose over Nancy Pelosi's
representations as to what she was and was not told in Gang of Eight briefings on the
treatment and interrogation of terror detainees. See, e.g. , Scott Shane, CIA Reviewing Its
Process for Briefing Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A16; Walter Pincus, House
Votes to Revise Intelligence Disclosure Rules for President, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, at
A13.
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procedures, Gang of Eight members retained the ability to claim
that they were helpless to act and thus blameless in light of the
restricted nature of the notice.
2.

The Exclusivist Defense of the TSP's Legality

The TSP was defended internally prior to the 2005 press
revelations, and publicly after the revelations, on the basis of
exclusivist reasoning. The basic exclusivist argument is that
Congress constitutionally may not restrict the President from
engaging in intelligence gathering activities that he deems
necessary to protect national security. Thus, PISA should not be
construed to prohibit the TSP in order to avoid the
constitutional question that would otherwise arise. Alternatively,
if PISA is construed to prohibit the TSP, it is unconstitutional
and can be circumvented by the President. 8 5 The substantial
problems with this argument have been rehearsed at length
elsewhere by myself and many others 86 and the bulk of that
discussion is beyond the scope of this essay.
What is quite relevant, however, is that exclusivist reasoning
typically is bolstered by assurances that the President bears
political responsibilitl for how he uses his exclusive
constitutional powers. 8 Yet in light of the secrecy that exclusivity
supports, such assurances, combined with exclusivist assertions,
often amount to a multi-step shell game. Step one (assertion):
Congress may not limit the President through measures like
FISA. Step two (assurance) : Congress still retains checking
power. It may make funding cuts, hold up presidential nominees
in committee, or take other blunt retaliatory measures if it does
not like the President's decisions and actions. 88 Step three
(assurance combined with assertion) : Congress may request
information to discern the President's decisions and actions.
Obtaining such information is a condition precedent to step two.
However, the President retains the constitutional prerogative to
refuse such information requests on the basis that fulfilling them

85. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 28-36.
86. See, e.g., Letter from Law Professors Curtis A. Bradley, et al. to Members of
Congress 3-7 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj
response.pdf; Heidi Kitrosser, "Macro-Transparency" as Structural Directive: A Look at
the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1 1 63, 1 199-206 (2007); John Cary
Sims, What NSA is Doing . . . and Why It's Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 128-32
(2006).
87. See Yoo, supra note 2 at 125-26.
88. Id.
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would harm national security or inhibit the candor of executive
branch deliberations.
Such shell games can span generations. For example,
Robert Bork testified against FISA in 1978, prior to its
enactment. He explained at the time that FISA "probably"
violates Article II for exclusivist reasons, 89 but that other
accountability mechanisms remain without FISA. Referring to
internal executive branch regulations in effect at the time, he
stated:
[I] t is impossible to imagine a President and an Attorney
General who would be so foolhardy as to materially weaken
their provisions. Furthermore, it is also true that there will be
oversight by the Congress about the enforcement of such
regulations, so I don't think we need to worry about future
administrations j ust changin� them without anybody in
Congress knowing about them. 0

Of course, as we have since seen, it is entirely possible not only
that a President would secretly circumvent or alter his own
regulations but that he would secretly circumvent statutory law.
As for congressional oversight, as we have seen it can be
thwarted by exclusivity-fueled secrecy.
The same may be said for another accountability avenue
suggested in Bork's testimony, that an agent who violates
internal regulations would "expose himself to criminal
liability. "91 As discussed below, we have seen in both the Bush
and Obama Administrations that civil judicial relief can be
thwarted through state secrets arguments grounded implicitly or
explicitly in Article II. An administration could decline to
initiate a criminal prosecution on the same basis. Finally, to add
a further twist to this cross-generational shell game, we have
seen administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan,
invoke prosecutorial discretion to decline to prosecute members
of their administration for actions, such as executive privilege
based refusals to testify, taken in the name of Article II.9

89. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 131, 134, 137-38 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 FISA Hearings] .
90. Id. 131.
91. Id. at 135.
92. Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who
Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101, 113-115
(1984). See also EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY 20 (2009).
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Thwarting Accountability after the Public Revelations
a.

Foreclosing Judicial Review
1.

Statutory Immunity

One important means to uncover and punish illegal
behavior is litigation. In the wake of revelations about the TSP, a
number of lawsuits were filed against telecommunications
companies for their alleged participation in the program. As
discussed in Part I, in 2008 a maj ority-Democratic Congress,
responding to pressure from President Bush and the constraints
of the aggression heuristic, passed legislation geared toward
ending these lawsuits. Title II of the FAA retroactively
immunizes telecommunications providers who cooperated with
the TSP from lawsuits, so long as the providers acted upon a
written request "from the Attorney General or the head of an
element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such
person) . . . indicating that the activity was �i) authorized by the
President and (ii) determined to be lawful."9
Exclusivity played important roles - both explicit and
implicit - in the campaign for retroactive immunity. First, some
supporters of Title II argued that the TSP was clearly legal from
an exclusivist perspective and that there was thus no illegal
behavior to punish. "For example, Senators Bond, Chambliss,
Hatch, and Warner criticized ' [t]hose who constantly harp on the
misleading assertion that the TSP was illegal.' The Senators
expressed their belief, 'without any doubt, that the President
properly used his authority under Article II . . . . "'94 Second,
some congresspersons and congressional witnesses made more
subtle use of exclusivity, relying on the general sense of legal
uncertainty to which exclusivist arguments gave rise. They
suggested that telecommunications providers could not fairly
have been expected to parse through difficult constitutional
questions to second-guess government requests to cooperate
with the TSP. For example:
[F]ormer Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin
told the Senate Judiciary Committee that it would have been
unfair to expect telecommunications companies to examine
93. PISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 802(a)(4)(B), 122 Stat.
2436, 2469 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (West 2010)).
94. Kitrosser, supra note 1, at _ (quoting S. REP No. 110-209, at 32 (2007)
(additional views of Senators Bond, Chambliss, Hatch, and Warner)).
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the legality of presidential requests to cooperate with the
TSP. He explained that " the legal questions . . . often involve
constitutional questions of separation of powers that have
never been squarely addressed by courts and are not readily
susceptible for analysis by lawyers at a company whose
primary concern is providing communications services to the
public. " Assistant Attorney General for National Security
Kenneth Wainstein testified before the same committee in
support of retroactive immunity. Wainstein also opposed
Inspector General review of the TSP, deeming it best to
"leave that aside in terms of . . . whether the TSP was within
the constitutional authority of the president or not, legal or
not, and j ust focus on how we're going to fix FISA for the
95
American people."

Consistent with the Article II shell game, immunity
proponents observed that other means for accountability existed.
In particular, many pointed out that lawsuits against the
government could still go forward. Yet as we shall see in the next
section, lawsuits against the government and providers alike
have faced another major blocking mechanism - one that spans
the Bush and Obama administrations - in the form of the state
secrets privilege.96 That roadblock, too, is underscored by
exclusivist reasoning.97
Of course, the adoption of retroactive immunity itself
moved the accountability ball from its previous location in FISA.
PISA had established its warrant procedures and enumerated
exemptions thereto as the "exclusive means" to conduct
wiretapping and had deemed non-compliant wiretapping legally
actionable. Indeed, telecommunications providers had supported
95. Kitrosser, supra note 1, at
(quoting PISA Amendments: How to Protect
Americans' Security and Privacy and Preserve the Rule of Law and Government
Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary llOth Cong. 49 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 PISA Hearings] (statement of Patrick Philbin, Partner, Kirkland &
Ellis); id. at 11 (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Dep't of Justice)). See also Kitrosser, supra note 1, at
(observing that Title II
proponents also argued that it would have been particularly unfair to expect
telecommunications providers to second-guess the government shortly after 9/1 1, but
noting that these proponents ignore the fact that the government requests were
reauthorized at regular intervals stretching well past 9/1 1).
96. State secrets and related arguments also helped to deter the passage of
suggested alternatives to retroactive immunity. Proposed alternatives included allowing
lawsuits against the providers to proceed and indemnifying the companies, and allowing
lawsuits to proceed but substituting the government for the providers as defendants. See,
e.g. , 2007 PISA Hearings, supra, at 11-15, 18-19, 25, 33 (Statement of Kenneth L.
Wainstein Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice), at 48-50 (Statement of
Patrick Philbin, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis).
97. See infra Part III.A.3.a.2.
_

_
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FISA's passage o n the basis that the legislation would give them
clear guidance as to when they legally could - and could not 
comply with government surveillance requests.98 From this
perspective, it is striking that immunity proponents argued,
thirty years later, that telecommunications providers could not
have been expected to assess the legality of government requests
to participate in the TSP.
Finally, one compromise accountability measure was
included in the FAA: a requirement that the Inspectors General
of the relevant intelligence agencies produce a reg ort on the TSP
and release an unclassified version of the report. This provision
led to a valuable unclassified report released in July 2009. That
said, a purely internal check conducted by members of the
executive branch is no replacement for meaningful external
checks by Congress or the judiciary. Nor is the IG Report a
comprehensive substitute for other accountability measures. For
examra le, the Report does not offer a view on the legality of the
0
TSP.1 And the IGs, who lacked the authority to compel
testimony, were unable to obtain the cooperation of several key
Bush Administration officials in preparing the report, including
"Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, White House
Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Attorney General John Ashcroft,
DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Deputy Assistant Attorney
General John Yoo, and former Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet. " 101
2.

State Secrets

Dozens of lawsuits indeed were brought against
telecommunications providers and the government regarding the
TSP. Whether as intervenors in the cases against private
companies or as defendants in cases against the government, the
98. See 1978 FISA Hearings, supra note 89, at 90-102 ( statement of H.W. William
Caming, Attorney, AT&T) . See also 2007 FISA Hearings, supra note 95, at 49-55
( statement of Morton Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute) .
99. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 301, 122 Stat. 2436,
2471-73; IG REPORT supra note 19, at Preface.
100. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, U.S. Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials
Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at Al; Spencer Ackerman, Stuff That's Missing From the
Inspectors General Report on Warrantless Surveillance, WASH. INDEPENDENT, July 10,
2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/50443/stuff-thats-missing-from-the-inspectors
general-report-on-warrantless-surveillance.
101. IG REPORT, supra note 19, at 4. See also Carrie Johnson & Ellen Nakashima,
'Inappropriate Secrecy' Hurt Surveillance Effort, Report Says, WASH. POST, July 11, 2009,
at A3.
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Bush Administration consistently sought to have the cases
dismissed on the basis that they could lead to the disclosure of
state secrets. The Obama Administration has followed suit,
pursuing the state secrets argument with full force in TSP cases
still pending when it took office.102
The Obama Administration followed the Bush
Administration's lead not only in pursuing state secrets based
dismissals, but also in arguing to courts that the privilege, while
developed at common law, "has a firm foundation in the
constitutional authority of the President under Article II to
protect national security information." 103 Both administrations
invoked Article II to argue not only that the President has an
inherent power to protect state secrets, but that at minimum
there is a serious constitutional question as to whether that
power is exclusive. In an April 2009 brief urging dismissal of
Jewel v. National Security Agency on state secrets grounds, for
instance, the Obama Administration "incorporate[ d] by
reference [the government's] prior detailed discussion" to the
effect that FISA should not be read to preempt the state secrets
privilege.104 The referenced prior argument was made in two
Bush Administration briefs in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation
v. Bush.105 There, the government had argued, among other
things, that a preemptive reading of FISA should be avoided
because "any effort by Congress to regulate an exercise of the
Executive's authority to protect national security through the
state secrets privilege would plainly raise serious constitutional
concerns, and it is well-established that courts should construe
statutory law to avoid serious constitutional problems unless
such construction is "'plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress. '" 106

102. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. Penn. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010) (detailing progression of the TSP cases and role of state secrets
doctrine in the same).
103. Government Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss and for
Summary Judgment at 12 n.9, Jewel v. National Security Agency, No. C:08-cv-4373VRW (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2009), 2009 WL 944175 [hereinafter Jewel Motion to Dismiss].
104. Jewel Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 23-24.
105. Jewel Motion to Dismiss, supra note 103, at 25 n.25 (citing to briefs filed in al
Haramain).
106. Defendants' Notice of Motion and Second Motion to Dismiss in or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment in al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, at 14,
564 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-cv-109-VRW), 2008 WL 5552047; see also
Defendants' Reply in Support of Second Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment in al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, 564 F. Supp. 1 109 (No.
07-cv-109-VRW), 2008 WL 1956160.
_
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The Bush and Obama administrations thus have both used
the state secrets doctrine as a means to move the accountability
ball further along, away from lawsuits against any party over the
TSP. And both have deemed it at least strongly arguable, on
exclusivist grounds, that Congress can not constitutionally curtail
the privilege. Indeed, the Bush Administration directly objected,
on exclusivist and other grounds, to legislation that Congress
considered in 2008 to place limits on the doctrine.107 While the
Obama Administration has not, as of this writing, spoken
directly to that legislation - the State Secrets Protection Act,
which was introduced in 2008 and again in 2009 - its exclusivist
response to the claim that FISA preempts the state secrets
privilege could obviously be applied to such legislation.
Furthermore, the Obama Administration has issued policy and
signing statements objecting to other information-sharing
requirements on exclusivist grounds.108 Finally, it is worth noting
that while the Obama Administration announced a new policy
whereby it would seek to invoke the privilege only when
necessary and as narrowly as possible in each case, this policy is
entirely internal to the Administration. It provides no means for
external accountability to check the Administration's use of the
policy.109 Such external accountability mechanisms would, of
course have to come from the courts or Congress. Yet the
legality of such mechanisms is called into question by the
exclusivist positions taken in the Bush and Obama
Administrations.

107. See Letter from Attorney Gen. Michael Mukasey to Sen. Patrick Leahy (Mar.
31, 2008), available at http://www.justice.govIarchive/ ola/views-letters/110-2/03-31-08-ag
ltr-re-s2533-state-secrets.pdf.
108. See Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. No. 501 (June 24, 2009); Statement on Signing the Fraud
Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 387 (May 20,
2009); Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. No. 145 (Mar. 11, 2009); Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1390- National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (July 15, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_lll/saps1390s_20090715.pdf; Statement of
Administration Policy: H.R. 2701- Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(July
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_lll/
aphr3081r_20090708.pdf.
109. See, e.g. , Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 625 (2010).
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b. Stymieing Congressional Inquiries
1.

During the Bush Administration

Congressional oversight is another means to facilitate
accountability over executive branch activities. As we have seen,
the Bush Administration avoided meaningful congressional
accountability about the TSP prior to the public revelations.
Even after the public revelations and the rule-of-law-based
political pressures that they engendered, and even after the
Democratic take-over of Congress after the 2006 elections, the
Bush Administration continued to resist oversight and
investigation through congressional hearings, and Congress
remained relatively quiescent.
As before the public revelations, exclusivity played an
important role in the Bush Administration's relationship to
oversight after the revelations. Even when exclusivity was not
invoked explicitly, exclusivist positions cast a large shadow over
negotiations and plans for congressional hearings. One such
position was the defense of the TSP's legality. The argument that
the TSP was perfectly legal plainly cuts against the notion that
the program was illegal and merits investigation. Furthermore,
as in the immunity context, this defense underscored arguments
to the effect that any investigations at best are much ado about
nothing and at worst are partisan witch-hunts. The other
exclusivist position that cast a shadow over the prospect of
congressional investigations was the argument that the President
must make the ultimate call as to when information should not
be disclosed. In particular, a shadow was cast by the ever-present
specter of executive privilege. An executive privilege claim is a
claim that the President may, under Article II, withhold
information on the basis that its disclosure would harm national
security or threaten the candor of executive branch discussions.110
Though invoked relatively rarely, executive privilege casts a long
shadow. Congress knows that an administration may "run out
the clock" by claiming executive privilege until the public tires of
a controversy, a special committee's tenure ends, or
administrations change, and this naturally factors into their
calculus. Furthermore, like the exclusivist defense of the TSP's
legality, the very existence of executive privilege doctrine helps
to imbue administration refusals to provide information with a
110. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491-92 (2007).
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specter of legitimacy even when executive privilege is not
invoked explicitly.11 1
In events bolstered by the shadows of both the exclusivity
defense of the TSP and executive privilege, the Senate
Intelligence Committee rej ected calls in early 2006 to hold
investigative hearings on the TSP.112 In return for the jettisoned
hearings, the White House agreed to provide limited briefings to
a special seven-person subcommittee.113 Such briefings were to
be styled like Gang of Eight briefings, with briefed members
barred from discussing the information with anyone else,
including fellow congresspersons.114 Yet members of the
subcommittee later complained that the Administration did not
keep its word to brief them under even these restricted
conditions. As subcommittee member Senator Rockefeller
lamented in September 2006:
For the past six months, I have been requesting without
success specific details about the program, including: how
many terrorists have been identified; how many arrested; how
many convicted; and how many terrorists have been deported
or killed as a direct result of information obtained through the
warrantless wiretapping program. I can assure you, not one
person in Congress has the answers to these and many other
fundamental questions. 1 1 5
.

The Senate Judiciary Committee was somewhat more
aggressive than the Intelligence Committee, holding oversight
hearings on the TSP beginning in early 2006. Yet these hearings
left much unexplored. For one thing, the Administration
opposed the calling of some witnesses and the committee
initially relented in their plans to call them. 1 16 Two prospective
witnesses whom the Justice Department opposed calling were
former Attorney General John Ashcroft and former Deputy

1 1 1. Id. at 500-01.
112. See Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Ex-Justice Lawyer Rips Case for Spying,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A3; Editorial, The Death of the Intelligence Panel, NEW
YORK TIMES, at A22; Patrick Radden Keefe, Orwell Would Be Proud, SLATE, Mar. 9,
2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137796/; Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Blocks
Eavesdropping Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2006, at A3.
113. See Eggen & Pincus, supra note 1 1 2.
114. Id.
115. Glenn Greenwald, Voting in the Dark on Eavesdropping, SALON.COM, Sept. 26, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2006/09/26/eavesdropping/index.html.
116. See Maura Reynolds & Greg Miller, U.S. Lawmakers Signal Plans to Monitor
Spying, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at A21 ; Eric Lichtblau & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Accord
in House to Hold Inquiry on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al.
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Attorney General James Comey.117 The Department explained
that Ashcroft and Corney would have nothing to add to
testimony already given by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
regarding the legal justifications for the TSP.11 8 In retrospect, the
Justice Department's bland observation that Corney and
Ashcroft had nothing to add was less than fully accurate. In May
of 2007, Corney finally appeared before the then Democrat
controlled Judiciary Committee, ostensibly to talk about the
firing of U.S. Attorneys.119 When questioned about the TSP,
Corney publicly revealed for the first time the existence of a
dramatic internal administration rebellion over the TSP in
2004.120
The Bush Administration also sought to stymie Judiciary
Committee inquiries on other occasions. At one point, for
example,
Vice-President
Cheney
successfully
lobbied
Republican members of the Judiciary Committee to oppose
closed door hearings · with telephone company executives who
had allegedly participated in the TSP.121 Furthermore,
administration witnesses who appeared before the Judiciary
Committee to discuss the TSP frequently refused to answer
questions.122 While the Administration did not formally claim
executive privilege with respect to these hearings, it explained its
intransigence by reference to the core justifications underlying
executive privilege - the preservation of national security and
deliberative candor in the executive branch.123
Finally, when Congress granted retroactive immunity to
telecommunications providers in the FAA in 2008, it did so
despite complaints by many congresspersons that the
Administration had refused to provide sufficient documentation

117. Reynolds & Miller, supra note 116 (citing letter from Assistant Attorney
General Moschella).
118. Id.
119. See David Johnston, Bush Intervened in Dispute Over N.S.A. Eavesdropping,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at Al.
120. Id.
121. See Speech of Senator Specter on Senate Floor, 153 CONG. REC. S15,719-22
(daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) ; Letter From Vice President Cheney to Sen. Specter (June 8,
2006) , 153 CONG. REC. S15720 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007 ) ; Letter from Sen. Specter to Vice
President Cheney (June 7, 2006) , 153 CONG. REC. S15,719-20 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) .
122. See, e.g. , Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's
Surveillance Authority: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17,
78, 84, 93, 95-96, 102-03, 120-21, 151-52, 160-61 (2006) .
123. See supra note 122. See also, e.g. , Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. William
E. Moschella to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Feb. 28, 2006) , attachment at 10-11 , 17-20,
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillancel7.pdf.
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for them to cast well-informed votes.124 At one point, the White
House had disclosed requested documents to the Senate
Intelligence Committee while refusing to disclose the same to
the House Intelligence Committee and the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees. A White House spokesperson explained
that the Senate Intelligence Committee "showed a willingness to
want to include in their legislation retroactive liability protection
for companies that were alleged to have helped the United
States in the days after 9/11 . . . . Because they were willing to do
that, we were willing to show them some of the documents that
they asked to see." As for the other committees, she said, "I
think that we'll wait and see to see who else is willing to include
that provision in the bill. "125
There are two senses in which these examples fit into a
larger narrative of an Article II shell game. First, the position
that the President may circumvent FISA for a long period of
time rests partly on the assurance that the President retains
political accountability for such circumvention. Yet if the TSP's
ostensible legality is used as a basis to thwart congressional
hearings, then a major accountability avenue is eluded. The
same is true where the basis for thwarted hearings is executive
privilege, a related exclusivist claim about information control,
or the shadow effect of such arguments. Second, stymied
hearings do not exist in a vacuum. To the extent that other
accountability mechanisms - such as judicial review - are also
thwarted based on exclusivist reasoning, missed or stunted
hearings are part of a larger pattern of Article II based
accountability avoidance.
2.

During the Obama Administration (thus far)

As President Obama took office, commentators speculated
as to whether he would support renewed congressional
investigations into the TSP and other Bush Administration
terrorism programs. Some debated whether he might also or
instead encourage Congress to create an independent
investigative commission. A number of congressional Democrats
championed such measures.126 As of March 2010, however, it
1 24. See, e.g. , Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2007 Amendments Act of
2007, S. REP. No. 1 1 0-258 at 19-20 (2008) (additional views of Sen. Leahy); S. REP. No.
1 10-209, at 42 (additional views of Sen. Nelson), 46-48 (minority views of Senators
Feingold, Wyden); 2007 FISA Hearings, supra note 95, at 2-5.
125. Editorial, The Price ofAdmission, WASH POST, Oct. 23, 2007, at A18.
1 26. See, e.g. , Shane, supra note 58, at WK3; William Fisher, To Investigate Bush or
.
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appears that neither the Administration nor sufficient numbers
of congresspersons have had nor will discover the will to
champion comprehensive new hearings or investigations.127 The
reluctance seems attributable at least partly to a combination of
the aggression heuristic and fears of being accused of running a
partisan witch-hunt.128 A reticence to investigate also is partly
explicable - and made more politically palatable, even politically
beneficial - by exclusivity.
For one thing, as we have seen, the frequent repetition of
the exclusivist defense of the TSP helped to create a public sense
that the program was legal or that at minimum the matter is one
on which reasonable minds can differ. This sense, in turn, adds
plausibility to the position that the nation ought not to linger on
questions about the TSP. It also helps to soften any appearance
of contradiction in statements by President Obama to the effect
that by and large the nation should "mov[ e] forward" and resist
backward looking investigations, but that " [t]hat doesn't mean
that if somebodef has blatantly broken the law, that they are
above the law. "12
Furthermore, President Obama's words and deeds since
taking office indicate a willingness to make copious use of
exclusivist objections to turning over requested information to
Congress,
including information
about the previous
Administration. The likelihood of such objections would surely
Not, THE PUBLIC RECORD, Feb. 13, 2009, http://pubrecord.org/politics/1009/to
investigate-bush-or-not/; David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look
into Bush Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at Al.
127. See, e.g. , WILLS, supra note 7, at 237-41; Mayer, supra note 20, at 99; Matt
Renner, Obama Administration Accused Again of Concealing Bush Era Crimes,
TRUTHOUT, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.truthout.org/10120912; Opinion, Derrick Z.
Jackson, Cheney's Dark Side-and Ours, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2009, at A15; Scott
Shane, Obama Faces a New Push to Look Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, at Al; Scott
Shane, Lawsuits Force Disclosures by CIA, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A12; David M.
Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Obama Resisting Push for Interrogation Panel, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2009, at Al.
There has been some congressional inquiry over the past year into Bush
Administration interrogation tactics. However, these hearings appear to have been fairly
limited. Furthermore, some are classified and it is not clear when and if unclassified
information from them will be made available. See, e.g. , Shane, Lawsuits Force
Disclosure, supra; David Johnston, Bitter Start to a Hearing on Interrogation Tactics, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2009, at Al4; Herszenhorn & Hulse, supra; Mark Mazzetti, Senate Panel
to Pursue Investigation of CIA, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at A14.
128. See supra note 58.
129. Transcript of interview of President Elect Obama by George Stephanopoulos
on ABC's This Week, Jan. 11, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/
Economy/story?id=6618199 (while Obama made this particular comment in response to
a question about a special prosecutor, he repeated his larger point about moving forward
and balancing forward-movement with the rule of law many times in multiple contexts) .
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factor into decisions by congresspersons as to whether to hold
hearings or to create an investigative commission. Indeed, the
Obama Administration's first public statements on executive
privilege arose in the context of attempts by the House Judiciary
Committee to have former Bush Administration officials testify
about controversial firings of U.S. Attorneys. A federal judge
had denied the officials' claims of blanket immunity and the
Obama Administration would have had to decide whether or not
to appeal the ruling had a compromise not been negotiated
between the committee and the officials. White House Counsel
Gregory Craig explained the dilemma that the White House
would have faced had the parties not reached a compromise:
"The President is very sympathetic to those who want to find out
what happened. But he is also mindful as President of the United
States not to do anything that would undermine or weaken the
institution of the presidency. " 130 Later in 2009, the Obama
Administration raised eyebrows when it said that it would not
permit its social secretary to appear before a congressional
committee in regard to a controversy over security at a White
House state dinner. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs
stated that " [b] ased on the separation of powers, staff here don't
go to testify in front of Congress. "13 1
The Obama Administration also has objected in several
signing and policy statements to requirements that
administrations share information with Congress.132 For example,
the Administration objected on exclusivist grounds to proposed
legislation to require notice to the full intelligence committees in
circumstances where administrations currently have discretion to
notify only the Gang of Eight. 1 33 The Administration also
threatened to veto an amended proposal, written in response to
its initial objection, to allow Gang of Eight notice while
requiring some general information - including the fact that
more detailed notice was given to the Gang of Eight - to be
provided to the full intelligence committees. 1 34
130. Jason Leopold, Conyers Cuts a Deal With Rove, Miers for Testimony in
Attorney Firings, PUBLIC RECORD, Mar. 4, 2009, http://pubrecord.org/politics/1015/rove
miers-to-testify-behind-closed-doors-about-attorney-firings/. See also, e.g. , Josh Gerstein,
Rove, Miers to Testify, POLITICO.COM, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0309/19631.html.
131. Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 2009, at C7.
132. See sources cited supra note 108.
133. Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2701 - Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010, supra note 108. See also, e.g. , Scott Shane, supra note 84, at Al6.
134. See Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, U.S. Office of Mgmt. and Budget to

520

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:483

To the extent that the Obama Administration and many in
Congress prefer to avoid congressional or independent
investigations of the TSP, then, they benefit from the shadow
effect of exclusivist arguments that have been advanced
generally and with respect to the TSP in particular. These uses of
exclusivity fit into the Article II shell game in the same way as
did such uses during the Bush Administration. First, when the
exclusivist defense of the TSP is bootstrapped to support the
view that the TSP should not be investigated, the latter
undermines the very premise of accountability that underscores
the former. Second, congressional and independent oversight are
hardly the only accountability mechanisms that have been
stunted by exclusivity. Indeed, in public remarks in May 2009,
President Obama explained his lack of enthusiasm for proposals
to create an independent investigative commission partly by
citing other accountability mechanisms. He maintained his belief
"that our existing democratic institutions are strong enough to
deliver accountability. The Congress can review abuses of our
values, and there are ongoing inquiries by the Congress into
matters like enhanced interrogation techniques. The
Department of Justice and our courts can work through and
punish any violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice. "135 Of
course, we have seen that in the context of the TSP, the Obama
Administration and others have helped to thwart some of these
alternative accountability mechanisms. Hence, the accountability
ball continues to move about, propelled by exclusivity among
other forces.
CONCLUSION
Over the past several decades, exclusivity has gone from
being a marginal and rarely invoked interpretive approach to
one with substantial influence in legal and political circles. As I
explain elsewhere, I find exclusivity to be deeply flawed, most
fundamentally in its conflation of the President's capacities to
act secretly and energetically with a legal prerogative to so act in
the face of prohibiting legislation.136 Nonetheless, those of us who
consider exclusivity to be mistaken and even dangerous in its
Sen. Diane Feinstein (Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/
2010/03/omb031610.pdf. See also, e.g. , Walter Pincus, White House Threatens Veto on
Intelligence Activities Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2010, at A4.
135. Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, 2009 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. No 388 (May 21, 2009), at 9.
136. See, e.g. , Kitrosser, supra note 1, at
.
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effects ignore its growing significance at our peril. Furthermore,
exclusivity's importance extends well beyond courtrooms and
academia. It has gained much influence in the realms of politics
and public debate.
This Article has sought not only to convey exclusivity's
rising political significance, but also to describe major factors
that contribute to the same. The Article has also sought to
examine some of the concrete ways that Article I and II actors
use and benefit from exclusivity and the negative impact of these
uses on government accountability. Understanding the politics of
exclusivity might help in part to puncture the myth that
exclusivity is simply a faithful reading of text, structure, and
history. At a more basic level, exclusivity, whatever its legal and
intellectual merits, is an important phenomenon within the
political branches. This is particularly so in the realm of national
security. If one is simply to understand the law and politics of
national security, let alone to engage with it, exclusivity is a
factor that ought not to be overlooked or underestimated.

